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Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes on the 
plant breeding sector in developing countries. Most of these countries have implemented a 
system of plant variety protection (PVP), or are in the process of doing so, generally as part of 
their obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper presents the results of research 
on the initial effects of IPRs on the plant breeding sector in five case study countries (China, 
Colombia, India, Kenya and Uganda). Three of the countries have PVP systems in place and 
the other two are in the process of either developing or implementing legislation. But the ease 
of implementing PVP seems to have been overestimated. Opportunities to minimize the 
transaction costs of acquiring and enforcing rights are being missed. Detailed interviews with 
both domestic and international seed companies suggest that PVP can not be expected to 
initiate the development of a commercial seed sector. But a well functioning system can play 
a role in stimulating further development of the sector, although a measured approach to 
increasing the scope of protection will probably better balance interests than rapid adoption 
standards of industrialized countries. The results also highlight the particular challenges 
facing national agricultural research institutes in determining how to best make use of IPRs, 
such as PVP, particularly given broader changes in publicly-financed agricultural research. 
 
JEL Codes: L3 Nonprofit organizations and Public Enterprise, O3  Technological Change; 




  This paper analyzes the effect of intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes on the plant 
breeding sector in developing countries. Most of these countries have implemented IPR 
protection for plant varieties, or are in the process of doing so, generally as part of their 
obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). TRIPS Article 27(3)b obliges member countries to 
offer patent protection and/or a sui generis form of intellectual property protection for plant 
varieties (PVP
1). Many countries in the South have consequently been developing and 
implementing (PVP) systems as a form of sui generis protection and choosing not to make 
patent protection available for plant varieties. WTO members are however still required to 
offer patent protection for inventions and these are also relevant for the plant breeding sector, 
                                                 
1 A system of plant variety protection (PVP) is also referred to by the specific name of the right conferred, 
namely Plant Breeder’s Right (PBR).   3 
particularly given the increasing application of modern biotechnology to plant breeding. The 
implementation of such patent protection is lagging though relative to PVP. 
  There have been several studies that have attempted to analyze the issue in 
industrialized countries, primarily focussing on the effects of PVP. As might be expected, it is 
often difficult to separate the effects of other economic and policy changes from those of 
IPRs. Several studies document an increase in private sector breeding for a number of non-
hybrid crops in the US since the PVP Act of 1970, but most attribute only a modest role to 
PVP for these changes (Butler, 1996; Lesser, 1997). Alston and Venner (2002) show that 
private sector investment in US wheat breeding has remained static while that of the public 
sector has increased since the introduction of PVP. Penna (1994) shows an increase in 
breeding investments in the UK for some horticultural crops, but not others. These and other 
mixed results lead some to conjecture that PVP may not be strong enough to encourage 
investments in plant breeding (Alston and Venner, 2002; Lence et al, 2005; Srinivasan and 
Thirtle, 2003). On the other hand, the overall inconclusiveness also lends support in some 
circles to general skepticism about the role of IPRs in economic development (Chang, 2002). 
  In this paper we present the results of research on the initial effects of IPRs on the 
plant breeding sector in five case study countries (China, Colombia, India, Kenya and 
Uganda).
2 The research methods, which are by necessity primarily qualitative in nature, are 
described in the next section. This is followed by a summary of the effects on plant breeding 
and seed companies. In almost all developing countries and economies in transition, the 
public sector has historically played an important role in the plant breeding sector. We 
therefore also assess the initial effects of IPRs on their behavior. The concluding section 
identifies some lessons for developing countries and other stakeholders supporting the 
                                                 
2 This paper is based primarily on a study commissioned by the World Bank under grant 
# 8001817. The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge very useful comments on this research by World 
Bank specialists D. Byerlee and E. Pehu, as well as the contribution of other members of the research team: V. 
Henson-Apollonio, R. Hu, M. Mendoza, F. Muhhuku, S. Pal & J. Wekundah. But all responsibility for the 
interpretations contained in this paper lies with the authors.   4 
implementation of IPRs, and also attempts to draw some general conclusions concerning the 
effect that PVP in particular has on plant breeding.  
 
Methods 
  The wide variation in plant breeding capacities and seed industries among developing 
countries demands a case study approach for this research. In this approach, we attempted to 
assess the general behavioral responses of stakeholders to the (potential) introduction of IPRs. 
The range of types of IPRs in force or contemplated, as well as the great variation in local 
institutions and farming systems, adds to the justification for a careful examination of a 
relatively few cases in terms of countries and crops.  The choice of examples is constrained, 
however, by the fact that many countries have yet to establish an IPR regime for plant 
varieties.  
  Because an assessment of the limited but varied experience requires in-depth 
fieldwork, a wide range of evidence had to be sought in a small number of developing 
countries that have started implementing IPR regimes in agriculture. Five case study countries 
were chosen to represent major segments of developing country agriculture, geographical 
spread, and level of experience with IPRs: China, India, Colombia, Kenya and Uganda. A 
common set of interview protocols were developed for the case study countries in order to 
obtain comparable information. Interviews were conducted with large numbers of 
stakeholders in each country, representing public plant breeding and seed production, the 
private seed sector (including representatives and IP specialists of major multinational 
companies), IPR and regulatory agencies, and farmers and farmer groups. Table 1 details the 
number of breeding organizations interviewed by country and according to whether these 
were private or public sector (but omits the other stakeholders). In many cases, numerous   5 
individuals were interviewed within each organization  Local data and reports were also 
collected and analyzed. 
 
Implementation of IPRs in case study countries 
  In terms of IPRs, most of the experience to-date in the case study countries has been 
with plant variety protection (PVP). Three of the countries have PVP systems in place and the 
other two are in the process of either developing or implementing legislation (see Table 2), 
while there is much less experience with patents for biotechnological inventions. But the ease 
of implementing PVP seems to have been overestimated in several countries. Countries 
require considerable time to experiment with the implementation of PVP and to understand 
the consequences 
  The manner in which PVP is designed and implemented affects bot the scope of 
protection provided and the transaction costs of acquiring and enforcing this protection. These 
two characteristics appear to be the key factors influencing to what extent breeding companies 
will make use of PVP. The scope of protection determines, in general terms, the degree to 
which breeders can appropriate benefits from new varieties. This is the subject of regular 
debate, particularly with respect to issues such as whether protection extends to harvested 
products and possible restrictions to the “farmers’ privilege” of saving, replanting and 
possibly exchanging or selling seed. The interviews undertaken highlight though how the 
transaction costs deserve more attention (see alse Léger, 2005). 
  The transaction costs associated with acquiring PVP consists primarily of application 
and renewal fees paid to the authority. There is not much difference in the costs of PVP 
between the 3 countries in the sample, despite significant differences in potential market size. 
(For the 3 countries it costs between $1,200 and $2,400 to register and protect a variety for 
five years; see Table 3.)  In addition, the countries take quite different approaches to the   6 
adjustment in fees during the period of protection; in some cases fees are lower in the earlier 
years (presumably to encourage testing the market). 
  Discussions about the level of fees charged for PVP are related to the question of 
whether a PVP authority can or should be expected to be self-supporting. If it cannot, then 
justifications for public investment are required. It was not possible to assess the degree of 
financial sustainability of the 3 case study PVP authorities in their early years of experience. 
The rapidly expanding Chinese PVP system is certainly not self-financing at this early stage 
(despite the claim that the fees are relatively high; see Koo et al. 2003), while the Colombian 
system (which does its own testing on a very limited number of crops and earns substantial 
revenues from the protection of foreign-origin IP) would appear to be viable. 
  The primary expenses incurred by PVP authorities is testing which involves trial 
plantings to evaluate a new variety against the criteria of distinctness, uniformity, and stability 
(DUS). This is one of the common elements of the UPOV system, which has provided for a 
harmonization of the technical guidelines for such testing. In Kenya, the application costs can 
be reduced by submitting test reports from, for example, a European PVP authority. Such 
reductions in transaction costs from acceptance of foreign reports are being missed in 
countries such as China where local testing is required. 
  The other principal transaction cost consists of resources devoted to enforcing one’s 
exclusive right to produce and market seed of a protected variety. The PVP agency itself is 
rarely the body responsible for enforcement. If PVP is to function efficiently concomitant 
enforcement capabilities and resources must be developed, particularly in the legal system. 
The few infringement cases described in Colombia indicate that sanctions for violations are 
not defined and that the courts are not well prepared. Experience from China shows that it 
takes some time for the courts to develop requisite expertise in this area. In all countries 
studied, private and public plant breeders do not necessarily recognize that the major   7 
responsibility for identifying violations and pursuing cases rests with them, implying 
additional investments of staff and resources. Multinational seed companes, on the other hand, 
are well aware of this and cite difficulties in enforcement, that is high transaction costs (or 
uncertainty associated with these costs) as one of the most decisive factors influencing their 
use of the PVP system.   
  Costs of enforcing rights are also affected by how the application and testing system is 
established. For example, some parts of the private sector have concerns about the security of 
deposited inbreds, particularly in China. International horticultural seed companies in 
particular, repeatedly pointed out that concerns about the security of DUS testing facilities 
were sufficient to prevent them from applying for PVP in certain markets and marketing their 
more valuable varieties. 
 
Plant Breeding and Seed Companies 
  There has been significant private seed sector activity in many developing countries 
even before the establishment of national IP regimes for plant varieties. By far the most 
dynamic private seed sector in the sample (India) has grown and diversified without benefit of 
any PVP regime but in the context of quite liberal seed laws and in many cases through the 
use of hybrids as a way of appropriation (e.g. Pray and Ramaswami, 1990; Pray et al., 2001). 
Colombia’s private seed sector is more than two decades old, but private seed enterprises in 
the other three countries are the outcome of fairly recent policy changes that move away from 
public monopolies on seed production. 
  Thus PVP is not a necessary condition for initial private seed sector development, but 
it may contribute to its growth and diversification. The only major example of private 
domestic plant breeding in Colombia is for rice, and the establishment of PVP almost 
certainly encouraged the further development of the industry, which is based on OPVs.   8 
Foreign companies also market protected OPVs of soybean and cotton, but it is difficult to 
point to examples of the diversification of the private seed industry in Colombia due to PVP. 
It is even more difficult to identify any effects of PVP on the nascent private seed industry in 
Kenya, where the few products of private domestic breeding have yet to seek protection and 
the hybrid maize offered by MNCs may not have PVP. In Uganda, exclusive rights over 
public varieties given to local private companies have contributed to the emergence of local 
seed enterprises, and it is worth noting that this was done without any formal IP-legislation. 
Although the (foreign) horticultural industry pressed for the establishment of PVP in 
Colombia and Kenya, and the  national regimes certainly provide added confidence and 
contribute to the perception of a better business environment for expansion, neighboring 
countries with similar ecologies but less developed PVP (e.g. Ecuador and Uganda) can still 
participate strongly in the industry.  The course of private seed sector evolution in China will 
depend on a wide range of factors, and the role of IP is uncertain. 
  Seed companies tend to take advantage of PVP and patents when it helps protect them 
against competitors gaining access to their materials. Thus OPV rice varieties are regularly 
protected in Colombia (as are cotton and soybean). Hybrid maize is not protected in Colombia 
because the hybrids are relatively secure. Similarly, OPV barley has sought protection in 
Kenya, but private hybrid maize varieties have yet to apply for PVP. In addition, those OPV 
crops that seek protection are ones that are grown in commercial systems, where variety and 
seed quality are important and where seed cost is a relatively small proportion of costs of 
production. Where hybrids are used in diversified seed industries, such as India and China, 
hybrids do attract the majority of interest for PVP.    
  A broader scope of protection in PVP systems can also limit farmers’ seed saving 
(such as intended by the 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention) in order to provide additional 
incentives for private seed provision, but there are no instances of this as yet in the case study   9 
countries except for the flower industry where on-farm production of planting materials is 
fairly adequately regulated by the breeders. Two cases were identified where there is 
movement to limit seed saving. In Colombia there is a considerable amount of seed saving 
and informal commercial sale of farm-produced rice seed and the industry would like to 
control this; a new resolution limits seed saving to farms below a certain size. In Kenya, there 
are complaints that wheat farmers save and trade the majority of their seed, rather than buying 
commercial stocks, and Kenya proposes making its regulations compliant with UPOV 1991. 
These instances involve relatively large-scale commercial agriculture where the extra costs to 
farmers of obligatory seed purchase will probably be acceptable, but the changes in law and 
regulation may open the door to much wider control of seed use without any obvious 
mechanism for discretion. In both cases authorities admit that it would be difficult to enforce 
such requirements with smallholders (as well as being politically sensitive). 
 
Public Sector Research Institutes 
  Whereas the intended effect of IPRs, in particular PVP, on private sector breeders, is 
relatively simply, the situation for public sector breeders is more complex. The use of IPRs by 
national agricultural research institutes (NARIs) may address three goals: revenue collection, 
recognition of achievement, and technology transfer. These goals may not always be 
compatible, and the development of adequate policies for the NARIs is a difficult task. The 
establishment of PVP regimes comes at a time when public agricultural research in 
developing countries is being asked to take much more responsibility for revenue generation.  
  In Colombia, for example, there is little evidence so far of potential revenue generation 
from public breeding. In Kenya, the fact that most of the maize hybrids grown by farmers are 
products of public breeding would indicate the possibility of substantial revenues, but the 
domestic and foreign private plant breeding sector is expanding rapidly. In Uganda, public   10 
plant breeding has not yet resulted in a widespread use of public varieties by farmers, and 
because it concentrated on OPVs until recently it has not contributed to the nascent seed 
industry. The private sector is still insignificant in terms of breeding. In India, although the 
vast majority of hybrid seed is now the product of private plant breeding, huge areas of wheat 
and rice are planted to public varieties, and even though only a fraction of that area is planted 
to purchased seed, the royalties could be significant.  But it would appear that there are no 
plans at present to shift away from the practice of selling breeder seed to any legitimate seed 
producer. In China, the system is in a state of flux, as public breeding institutions for major 
crops are making the transition to take partial responsibility for revenue generation. As there 
are substantial quantities of public varieties of many important field crops grown with 
purchased seed (especially hybrid rice and maize), the revenue generating possibilities are 
substantial. But public funding and broader mandates are also important.   
  The expectations of NARI management for the amounts of revenue that can be 
generated are thus quite high. The degree to which a PVP system can help generate income 
for NARIs depends to a large extent on whether NARIs can keep control of plant breeding 
skills and resources for commercially important crops. The experience of India in the past two 
decades is instructive; as policy changes encouraged the emergence of private plant breeding, 
the expertise for commercial (largely hybrid) seed crops began to shift from the public to the 
private sector, even for supposedly ‘marginal’ crops like sorghum and pearl millet. As the 
private seed sector developed in India, NARI staff were hired away, and the private sector 
now offers an attractive alternative. In the smaller countries studied, the ability of the NARI to 
retain plant breeding personnel and resources in the face of an expanding private seed sector 
is even more in doubt. In Kenya, KARI’s traditional partner, the Kenya Seed Company 
(KSC), is now a rival, with a separate breeding program, and other domestic companies are 
assembling their own breeding resources.    11 
  A fundamental problem with revenue generation from PVP is that the potential 
opportunities are generally concentrated in more commercial crops which could lead to 
questionable public research resource allocations. Should hybrid rice research earn much 
more than wheat research just because of differences in seed systems? Although it makes 
sense to assign research resources to crops and problems for which there is high farmer 
demand, commercial seed systems often provide imperfect signals of that demand. There are 
already indications that these signals from the seed system and associated PVP are making 
their marks on NARI priority setting. This can be seen with the case of hybrid rice in Hunan 
and Guangdong provinces, as well as with the longer running approach to vegetable breeding 
in China. NARO in Uganda is encouraged to concentrate on research where commercial 
contracts or PVP will provide revenue, and KARI’s calculations for income are based on 
hybrid maize.  
  The emergence of PVP thus comes at a time when there are many uncertainties about 
the role of NARIs relative to the private sector in terms of mandate crops and the division of 
labor between upstream and downstream research. The dilemma is that in most countries the 
conventional private seed sector does not have the incentives to produce and market the full 
range of public sector varieties for which there may be farmer demand, such as beans, but the 
public sector has shown itself incapable of organizing an efficient alternative. 
 
Conclusions 
  This research contributes to developing an understanding of what the effects of IPRs 
will be on the plant breeding and seed sector in developing countries and economies in 
transition. An improved understanding will help clarify some of the debates and controversial 
issues surrounding IPRs. The picture that is emerging is quite rich in complexity which is due 
to the array of factors that affect the decision-making of plant breeders and seed companies.    12 
  The immediate policy implications of the findings are that IPRs such as PVP can not 
be expected to initiate the development of a commercial seed sector. Many other factors, 
including for example efficient seed regulations, play an important role in early stages. Once 
these have been passed, PVP  does appear to contribute to a more transparent and efficient 
sector, although the scope of protection need not necessarily too strong at this point. For 
countries deliberating on how to fulfill their TRIPS obligation or facing demands to 
implement broader IPRs for plant varieties in negotiations concerning bilateral trade and 
investment agreements with the U.S. or the E.U., the results suggest a measured approach. It 
may well be better to take advantage of the flexibilities in TRIPS which allow for instance for 
a staggered introduction and tightening of IPRs according to say particular crop sectors. 
  The results also highlight the importance of devoting more attention in the 
implementation of PVP systems to the minimalization of transaction costs associated with 
acquiring and enforcing rights. In this regard, further research could explore the tradeoffs in 
alternative fee schedules and scenarios for self-sufficient PVP offices. Opportunities to 
maximize the benefits from PVP by reducing transaction costs are currently being missed in 
the arrangements for DUS testing. In general, it is thus important to look not only at the scope 
of protection and the wording of the legislation. 
  Similarly, these results can also provide inspiration for a richer analytical and 
theoretical treatment of IPRs in which appropriability and the transaction costs are examined 
in a more specific manner. With respect to empirical research, we argue that there is an 
important role for more qualitative studies of this nature that seek to identify or predict 
changes in behavior based on detailed, semi-structured interviewing. In many developing 
countries, it will be some time before sufficient data is available for econometric analysis. In 
this study, we found that even a coding of responses to interview questions would have buried 
much of the rich information gathered. This is particularly apparent in the reaction of NARIs   13 
to PVP and other IPRs, and it appears that this is an issue of pressing concern for policy 
makers (see also Byerlee and Fischer, 2002). 
  Finally, the increasing spread of biotechnology in agricultural plant breeding in 
developing countries implies that the IPR situation will become more complicated, and this is 
already being seen in some countries. The effective implementation of patent systems is 
lagging in many countries, but their introduction in the field of agricultural biotechnology is 
more complicated than is the case with PVP. In addition, patents and PVP will overlap, 
raising again questions about how the details of such implementation can minimize 
transaction costs. This should provide plenty of possibilities for further research in the future. 
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Table 1: Number of seed and plant breeding organizations interviewed by type and 
country 
 
  China  Colombia  India  Kenya  Uganda 
Private domestic seed 
companies 
8  7  10  9  8 
Multinational companies  5  5  7  5  3 




10  2  8  4  5 
Total  23  14  25  18  16 
Notes 
a) Includes national and provincial crop breeding institutes, other national agricultural research organizations 
active in plant biotechnology for crop development, universities and also international agricultural research 
centres active in the country (one in each country with exception of China where none were interviewed). 
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Table 2: PVP legislation in the case study countries 
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Table 2. Costs of PVP 
 




$217  $233  $200  $1,115  $432 
Testing 
 
$556  $1,396 
($155 if done 
abroad) 
$600  $1,265 – 
$1,490 
(depending on 


























Cost of PVP 














Cost of PVP 













Source: PVP offices in case study countries; website of the European Community Plant Variety Office 
(www.cpvo.eu.int) (fees converted at 1.24$/euro); website of Plant Variety Protection Office of USDA 
(www.ams.usda.gov/science/pvpo/PVPindex.htm). 
 